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To build a theory of social complexity, we need to understand how aggregate social properties arise
from individual interaction rules. Here, I review a body of work on the developmental dynamics of
pigtailed macaque social organization and conﬂict management that provides insight into the
mechanistic causes of multi-scale social systems. In this model system coarse-grained, statistical rep-
resentations of collective dynamics are more predictive of the future state of the system than the
constantly in-ﬂux behavioural patterns at the individual level. The data suggest that individuals
can perceive and use these representations for strategical decision-making. As an interaction history
accumulates the coarse-grained representations consolidate. This constrains individual behaviour
and providesthe foundations for newlevels of organization. The time-scales on which these represen-
tations change impact whether the consolidating higher-levels can be modiﬁed by individuals and
collectively. The time-scales appear to be a function of the ‘coarseness’ of the representations and
the characterof the collective dynamics over which theyare averages. The data suggest that an advan-
tage of multiple timescales isthattheyallow social systemsto balance tradeoffs between predictability
and adaptability. I brieﬂy discuss the implications of these ﬁndings for cognition, social niche
construction and the evolution of new levels of organization in biological systems.
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social complexity
1. INTRODUCTION
The origins of social complexity have long fascina-
ted anthropologists, sociologists and biologists [1–5].
Attempts to classify social structures by their complexity
remain largely qualitative. Two reasons for this are that
there is little agreement about what constitutes social
complexity and there are few formal complexity
measures that work well on real-world data [6,7]. One
way to ground the discussion of what social complexity
is and how to measure it, is to study how functionally
signiﬁcant aggregate properties arise from microscopic
dynamics. Such an approach can reveal the natural
scales of the system and the types of structure associated
with those scales [8]. This can clarify the kinds of formal
complexitymeasures[9]thatmightbeusefullyappliedto
measure ordered states at different levels of social organ-
ization. In addition, before one asks about complexity at
the macroscopic scale, one might ask why there are
multiple scales at all.
In this paper, I review a body of work on the devel-
opmental dynamics of pigtailed macaque social
organization and conﬂict management. This work
suggests that ‘higher organizational levels’ in social sys-
tems arise when coarse-grained representations of
interactions at lower levels become useful to individ-
uals for decision-making. The time-scales on which
these representations change are a function of their
‘coarseness’ and the collective dynamics over which
they are averages. The data further suggest that
multiple time-scales allow social systems to balance
tradeoffs between predictability and adaptability.
2. BACKGROUND
Little is known about the functional diversity of social
network structures or how functionally signiﬁcant,
aggregate social properties encoded in these networks
arise. We also know little about the time-scales on
which these social structures and their associated stat-
istical properties change—hence the extent to which
social structure can inﬂuence behaviour through feed-
back. These are questions about the construction or
development of social systems and, more generally,
pattern formation and collective behaviour.
The well-developed body of work on the evolution
of institutions [10,11] might, in principle, seem rele-
vant to these developmental questions. In practice,
however, studies of institutions rarely address issues
of construction of complex aggregate social traits.
Instead, ‘institution’ more often than not is a code
word for counts or ratios of strategies in a given equilib-
rium distribution. Although simplifying the problem of
institutions in this way makes models tractable and may
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Many of the institutions observed in human and other
social systems have a more complicated statistical
character and this needs explaining.
Whenthemodelsandstatisticsusedtooperationalize
an institution or aggregate social property are not just
countsover strategies butrequire a more elaboratecom-
putation, and when the inputs are not simply individual
traits (cooperate, defect, etc.) but network data, then
we need to consider explicitly the mapping between
behavioural strategies at the individual level and social
organization[6].Howdothesestrategiesgetcollectively
combined by multiple individuals to produce aggregate
social properties? How much degeneracy characterizes
this mapping? Once we can describe how an aggregate
social property is produced, we can study how the
social process producing it might have evolved.
These kinds of questions should be familiar to read-
ers who know the history of the debate in evolutionary
theory surrounding the genotype–phenotype map (for
review, see [12]). Two long-standing assumptions in
population genetics are that the g-p map, as it is
called, is simple, and that the time-scale on which
the environment changes is slow enough compared
with evolutionary (or behavioural) change that it can
be treated as static (the adiabatic assumption).
We now know that the ﬁrst assumption is wrong for
most organisms—the gene activation patterns under-
lying phenotypic traits are modulated by complex
regulatory machinery that itself evolves—the work of
Eric Davidson and co-workers on echinoderm develop-
ment stands as an excellent example [13,14]. And,
the second assumption, which if correct would justify
studying development and evolution independently, is
problematic in any system in which organisms (or com-
ponents) can modify environmental variables and by
modifying them change the selection pressures to
which they are subject, as in ecological [15,16]a n d
social niche construction [17]. The consequences of
softening these assumptions are now being explored
by researchers who work in the evolution of develop-
ment and related ﬁelds like epigenetics. With these
advances, we are seeing the beginnings of an evolu-
tionary theory that can account for the origins and
diversity of complex forms, as well as for causes of
gene change [18].
The role of developmental dynamics has long been
debated in the larger evolutionary theory, and so
research programmes emphasizing developmental
mechanismshavebeenpursuedinparalleltopopulation
genetics. Hence the current merger of development and
evolution was in a way poised to happen as the data to
give momentum to the merger have been (partly) col-
lected. In social evolution, on the other hand, there
has only been the game-theoretic-population-genetics
trajectory with no sizable quantitative research pro-
gramme on the developmental dynamics of social
organization running in parallel [19] (an exception is
the work on social insect societies). Consequently,
social evolution lags behind the larger evolutionary
theory in its quantitative progress understanding the
origins and diversity of complex societies.
With the goal of illustrating the kinds of data and
studies that are needed to address developmental
questions, I review here what we know about the
developmental dynamics of social organization from
studying the consolidation of power structure in maca-
que societies.
1 My collaborators and I use pigtailed
macaque (Macaca nemestrina) society as a model
system for studying how aggregate social properties
arise because functionally signiﬁcant course-grained
information about ﬁghting ability has been shown to
be encapsulated in a distribution of power [21–23].
In this system, power—the degree of consensus
among group members that an individual can use
force successfully during a ﬁght—predicts the cost of
social interaction. The data I review below suggest indi-
viduals use this information to choose among social
interaction strategies. In addition, heavy-tailed distri-
butions make accessible intrinsically costly robustness
and conﬂict management mechanisms like third-party
policing, by reducing the cost of these strategies to neg-
ligible for individuals in the tail of the distribution [24].
Whereas power reduces uncertainty about the cost an
individual is likely to pay during social interactions
and for some individuals the cost of social interaction,
policing reduces the average cost of social interac-
tions [25]. Together policing and power facilitate the
construction of integrated social networks that afford
individuals more reliable access to a greater diversity
of social resources such as coalition partners and
knowledgeable individuals [17,25].
As the studies cited above illustrate, power in
pigtailed macaque society is a critical social variable.
However, power is not a simple variable. The dis-
tribution of power does not map directly onto a
distribution of body sizes or even a distribution of ﬁght-
ing abilities. Rather, it is constructed collectively as
individuals learn about one another’s ﬁghting abilities
and signal about this to reduce social uncertainty. In
§3, we review data on the process by which power
structure arises from aggression dynamics.
3. CASE STUDY: CONSOLIDATION OF POWER
STRUCTURE IN A PRIMATE SOCIETY
Thedatausedinourcasestudycomelargelyfromstudies
of conﬂict dynamics in a group of socially housed pig-
tailed macaques kept at the Yerkes National Primate
Center in Lawrenceville, Georgia. Study system details
anddatacollectionprotocols,aswellasoperationaldeﬁn-
itions, can be found in detail in the methods sections of
the work cited and in brief in §6 of this paper.
We have deﬁned an individual’s social power as the
degree of consensus among group members that it can
use force successfully during agonistic interactions
[21,26]. Consensus is important when interactions
are not strictly pairwise but can involve multiple indi-
viduals. In the pigtailed macaque study group, as we
will review, information about power is encoded in a
subordination status-signalling network. A power dis-
tribution consolidates as each individual integrates
over its incoming signals to estimate how it is perceived
by the group [21,23]. This signalling network arises in
turnfromanunderlyingaggressionorﬁghtoutcomenet-
work.Hencemultiple,hierarchicallyorganizednetworks
underlie the distribution of power. We sketch below
the process generating each network and, ultimately,
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supplementing these details with new results.
(a) Fight outcome network
Individuals interact. An interaction is any event in which
there is an opportunity for immediate contact or in
which a signal has been exchanged. Interaction patterns
vary across time, such that at any given moment, some
fraction of group members is in contact, proximity or
signalling from afar. Some of these interactions are
ﬁghtsfordominanceandotherresources.Whetherindi-
viduals win or lose ﬁghts depends on (reviewed in the
studies [22,27]) temporally stable factors—including
body size, ﬁghting experience and size of alliance net-
works. Contextual factors, including fatigue, variation in
priorities, leverage [28], the presence of coalition part-
ners and immediate past successes or failures in ﬁghts
are also important insofarasthey generatestochasticity
in ﬁght outcomes, but it is temporally stable factors that
predict who will be the winner on average.
In our analyses, the number of nodes in the study
group’s ﬁght outcome network is given by the number
of socially-mature individuals, n ¼ 48. The number of
potential edges, or agonistic dyads, is (48  48)–48 or
2256 (in these analyses we do not consider self-loops).
Of those 2256 dyads, 761 dyads were observed to
ﬁght (here meaning that at least one individual in the
dyad directed aggression at the other) at least once
duringthestudyperiod(datacollectiondetailsprovided
in §6). The mean number of agonistic interactions per
individual (as either the initiator or initial recipient)
was 2.11 (s.d. ¼ 0.713). The mean is low because the
ﬁght outcome matrix is relatively sparse.
An individual can win, lose or draw in these inter-
actions. For the reasons described above, the outcome
of interactions can vary in time. The directional con-
sistency index for the outcome of ﬁghts in the study
group is 90.16 per cent. The directional consistency
index [29] is calculated by summing over all dyads,
the absolute value of wins minus losses for each
dyad, divided by the total number of encounters for
all individuals. It is a measure of the consistency of
outcomes in aggregate (over all observed ﬁghts
between a pair considered over all dyads) and hence
provides a crude measure of stochasticity.
By constructing a ﬁght outcome time series for each
pair of individuals, we can determine for that pair the
number of times that ﬁght outcome changes over
sequential ﬁght bouts from win to lose to draw, etc.
This allows us to determine the extent to which ﬁght
outcomes vary temporally, from ﬁght to ﬁght.
Of the 761 dyads that were observed to ﬁght, ﬁght
outcome (edge directionality in the ﬁght outcome net-
work) changed 292 times. For these dyads, the mean
number of outcome changes per dyad was 0.384
(s.d. ¼ 0.9285) and the mean number of changes per
dyad per hour was 0.003. The maximum number of
outcome changes observed per dyad was 11 and the
minimum was 1. Although the directional consistency
index suggests that ﬁght outcomes are fairly consistent
in aggregate, the time-series data reveal the presence
of ﬁght-to-ﬁght ﬂuctuations. Hence reliance on any
single outcome as a predictor of future outcomes for
decision-making can be misleading.
(b) Subordination signalling network
Once a pattern of losing exceeds a certain threshold,
the individual perceiving itself as likely to lose signals
this recognition using a bared teeth (BT) display
[27,30–32]. In pigtailed macaques, BTs are emitted
in two contexts: ﬁghts and peaceful interactions in
which one individual passes by or approaches the
other, showing no threatening behaviour [32]. Both
displays in our pigtail macaque group are highly uni-
directional, meaning the same individual emits the
signal nearly 100 per cent of the time until the per-
ceived asymmetry in ﬁghting ability is deemed by the
signaller to no longer hold (peaceful variant dci:
99.7%; agonistic variant dci: 96.6% [32].
Individuals exchanging peacefully-emitted silent-
BT displays have stronger afﬁliative relationships
with one another (more grooming, more reconciliation
and less aggression) than those who only exchange the
BT display during ﬁghts. Multiple analyses described
in Flack & de Waal [32] indicate that this relationship
is causal: giving silent-BT displays in peaceful contexts
improves relationship quality.
We also ﬁnd that individuals who receive more peace-
fully emitted signals have more interactions (ﬁgure 1d),
where an individual’s interaction frequency is opera-
tionalized to include its subordination signalling events,
regardless of whether it is the sender or receiver, and all
of its agonistic interactions, regardless of whether it is
the initiator or initial recipient. Our previous work [32]
suggests that receiving signals increases interaction rate,
rather than the other way around.
Whereas the agonistic BT variant signals sub-
mission—deﬁned as impending withdrawal in the
present interaction, the data in the studies reviewed
above suggest the peacefully emitted silent-BT displays
are subordination signals that communicate agreement
to a primitive social contract in which the signaller
agrees for some time period to the subordinate role,
and thus to yield when a conﬂict arises in the future.
The contract is cost-free (originally deﬁned by Smith
&Harper[33],seealsoBergstrom&Lachmann[34]),as
both sender and receiver prioritize the exchange of the
signalabovenotsignalling(signallingistheoptimalstrat-
egy for the individual perceiving itself as the loser)
[22,32].Thecontractisupheldaslongastwoconditions
are satisﬁed. The signaller yields when the receiver
expresses an interest in a resource, and the underlying
asymmetry must continue to be perceived by the subor-
dinate as large. We have proposed that an advantage of
the contract is that it establishes a new conditional sym-
metry, in which the sender and receiver are free to
interact (e.g. groom, etc.) with a reduced concern that
a ﬁght will erupt—a form of conditional equality [32].
A subordination signalling network, also called a sub-
ordination contract network, can be constructed from
the pairwise signalling data.
2 The number of nodes in
the subordination signalling network is given by the
number of socially-mature individuals. In the case of
our study group, again n ¼ 48. The number of potential
edges, or agonistic dyads in this group, is again (48 
48)–48 or 2256. Of those 2256 dyads, 704 exchanged
at least one peacefully-emitted subordination signal,
givinganetworkwith704edges.Figure1ashowsthesig-
nalling network and ﬁgure 1b the unweighted in-degree
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node i) in the pigtailed macaque study group for a stable
4 month period (empirical methods).
The data suggest it takes several reversals of edges
in the ﬁght network before a signal is withheld and
many more before signal sender and receiver reverse
their contract [31,32,35]. This means that statistical
features of the signalling network—for example, the
rate of edge ﬂipping and the weighted degree distribu-
tion, should be relatively impervious to ﬂuctuations in
ﬁght outcomes.
Our data support this conclusion. By constructing a
signal exchange time series for each signalling pair, we
can determine for each pair the number of times that
the direction of signal exchange changes (e.g. individ-
ual i signalled to j at t1 and j signalled to i at t2). Of the
704 dyads that were observed to exchange signals,
signal direction reversed only twice—once in each of
two dyads—over the course of the 4 month study
period. The mean number of changes to signal direc-
tion per dyad was 0.003 (s.d. ¼ 0.053) and the mean
number of changes in signal direction per dyad per
observation hour was 0.00002. The maximum
number of switches observed per dyad was 1.
Based on these averages, edges in the signalling
network change approximately 165 times (roughly
two orders of magnitude) more slowly than edges in
the aggression network. These data in combination
with the directional consistency index for signal direc-
tion indicate that subordination signalling is highly
deterministic at both the event and aggregate levels,
whereas ﬁght outcomes are fairly to highly deter-
ministic in aggregate but ﬂuctuate across ﬁghts.
The subordination contract encodes coarse-grained,
reliable information about ﬁghting ability and conse-
quently a single signalling event is a better predictor
of ﬁght outcomes than any single ﬁght outcome is.
My collaborators and I have called these kinds of
predictive, coarse-grained variables slow variables [6].
Insummary,anasymmetryinperceivedﬁghtingabil-
ity builds up at the pairwise level through memory of
past outcomes of competitive interactions. Once it
becomes clear to one individual in a given pair that
it is more likely to lose a ﬁght (e.g. a threshold is
passed) with its adversary, the individual perceiving
itself as the likely loser emits a subordination signal.
This is the optimal strategy if it cannot win—hence
the signal is said to be cost-free. Individuals appear to
reference the signal exchange, rather that ﬁght out-
comes, for strategical decision-making because the
signal changes direction more slowly than ﬁght out-
comes and is not inﬂuenced by transient contextual
frequency signals received 
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Figure 1. (a) Subordination signalling network. Nodes are individuals and are coloured by frequency of signals received (orange
node receives largest number of signals). (b) Frequency distribution of number of signallers to a given receiver (unweighted in-
degree distribution of signaller number). (c) Frequency distribution of social power, where power is computed for individual i
by multiplying i’s total number of signals received by its number of signallers (§6). (d) Relationship between signals received
and interaction frequency (operationalized as signals received plus signals emitted plus ﬁghts participated in).
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state. The reduction in the frequency of aggression—
and hence the opportunity for reversing the dominance
relationship—that follows signal exchange further con-
solidates the dominance–subordination relationship.
However, some level of ﬁghting continues, providing a
mechanism for relationship reversal.
(c) Power structure
Encoded in the subordination signalling network is infor-
mation about power;that is, how much consensusthere is
among group members that an individual is capable of
successfully using force. Elsewhere [21,23], we have
explored the utility of various information theoretic and
diffusion-based algorithms for computing consensus on
networks about node i’s capacity to use force. The algor-
ithms take a subordination signalling matrix as input
and output a score for each individual. The index of
scores gives the distribution of power. Our analyses indi-
cate that individuals take into account how many signals
they receive in total from their population of signallers
weighted by a measure of the diversity of that signalling
population (which can be a simple count of the number
ofsignallersorsomethingmoreelaborateliketheShannon
entropyof the vector of signals received by individual i)t o
estimate how much consensus there is in the group about
their capacity to use force, and hence how much power
others collectively perceive them to have.
3
The data suggest that in addition to having the
capacity to estimate their absolute power, the individ-
uals in the study system are capable of roughly
estimating their relative power, and hence know some-
thing about the distribution of power in the group
[21,24]. We are presently exploring the heuristics the
animals could be using to make such estimates. This is
a critical issue, as such aggregate social variables pro-
duced from a collective process (many individuals
contribute to signal network structure) can only have
causal or feedback consequences for individuals in the
system if the individuals can make reasonable estimates
of those variables from the behavioural sample to which
they have accessandgiven theircomputationalcapacity.
Figure 1c shows the distribution of power in the
pigtailed macaque study group. The distribution is
not signiﬁcantly different than log-normal according
to the Lilliefors test.
An individual’s estimate of its power can predict,
when the estimate is a good one, the cost it will pay on
average during social interactions, thereby changing
theprobabilityofsocialstrategyuse,andtheaccessibility
of strategies, like policing, for managing conﬂict [24].
In general an individual’s power score will change
more slowly than any one of its contracts because
either manyofits contracts needtochange or manycon-
tracts of other individuals need to change, before its
power score will change. Although this suggests that
power,like thesubordinationcontract,isaslowvariable,
serving as a reliable reference for decision-making we do
not have enough data in the present case study to esti-
mate the precise time-scales on which properties of the
power distribution change.
Yet, the time-scale on which power changes is likely
to be critically important. Although the power structure
must change slowly to be useful for prediction, it cannot
change too slowly because it needs to approximately
represent the underlying distribution of ﬁghting
abilities,andthischangesover time[22].Henceimport-
ant questions include (a) what is the optimal degree of
correlation between the power distribution and the
underlying distribution of ﬁghting abilities, (b) how
stationary is this correlation, (c) how does the algorithm
used to compute power scores from the signalling net-
work inﬂuence the time-scale on which features of the
power distribution change, and (d) how well can indi-
viduals, given their computational capacity, estimate
their relative scores given the complexity of topology
of the signalling network and the computational steps
required to assess consensus?
(d) Emergence of novel social functions
Apositivelyskeweddistributionofpowerwithalongtail
(e.g. power-law tail) describes a society in which a non-
vanishing minority of individuals are collectively per-
ceived as disproportionately powerful. The power
structure in our study group is best described by this
kind of heavy-tailed distribution [21]. The data suggest
that these power structures can support the imple-
mentation of novel, beneﬁcial conﬂict regulatory
mechanisms, such as policing [24]. For any individual
to adopt this policing role, it must be able to estimate
the cost it will pay for intervening, and that cost must
be low. In our study group, this cost is negligible for
the individuals in the tail of the power distribution [24].
A behavioural knockout experiment in which the
policing mechanism was temporarily disabled by
preventing the policers from intervening in ﬁghts,
showed that policing increases societal robustness to
conﬂict perturbations [17,25]. Knockout resulted in
a destabilization of the groups’ social networks: the
cost of social interaction increased, investment
in social capital acquisition, like alliance partners,
decreased, and the cliquishness and assortative
structure of the group’s social networks increased.
Hence in this system a heavy-tailed distribution of
power makes intrinsically costly conﬂict management
mechanisms like policing more accessible strategies
by reducing their cost for individuals towards the tail
of the distribution. Policing in turn reduces the average
cost of social interactions for all individuals and so
allows for more efﬁcient social, and presumably
ecological, resource extraction.
4. MAIN FINDINGS OF CASE STUDY
Underlying the consolidation of the power distribution
and emergence of policing are several hierarchically
o r g a n i z e dn e t w o r k s( s h o w ni nﬁgure 2 schematically)—
an interaction network (which I have not discussed
here), a ﬁght outcome network, and a status signalling,
or social contract, network.
Ourdatasuggestthatthe advantageofmultiple,hier-
archically organized networks are that their variable
rates of change can be used to maximize objectives
that would be at odds if there was only a single time-
scale.Individuals, by temporarilyagreeing toacontract,
reference the slowly changing contract for strategic
decisions concerning the receiver (or dominant part-
ner) rather than the rapidly changing and potentially
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individual. Individuals use information about their rela-
tive power encoded in the signalling network to make
decisionsabouthowtobehaveduringpolyadicconﬂicts,
asdescribedatthebeginningofthiscasestudy.Allowing
a low level of ﬁghting to continue even after contracts
are formed and a stable power structure has been
established is advantageous because it prevents lock-in
by allowing learning to continue. This provides a mech-
anism by which the social contract can be reversed (and
relative power can change) as new asymmetries become
established and old ones get modiﬁed.
Our analyses suggest that the power structure arises
through the collective (across multiple individuals)
accumulation of memory of asymmetric, and typically
competitive, outcomes. This accumulation of memory
is stored in the slowly changing signalling network.
Asthepowerstructurebecomesestablished,asymmetries
at the individual level are ampliﬁed through feedback
effects. Hence as a history of competitive outcomes
builds up, the coarse-grained representations of these
microscopic dynamics consolidate around stable values
and so become slowly changing predictors of the social
system’s future state. This reduces social uncertainty by
providing a stable social environment against which indi-
viduals can tune their behavioural interaction strategies.
5. DISCUSSION AND BROADER IMPLICATIONS
Statisticalpropertiesofthepowerdistribution(e.g.mean
power score, variance, rank order) encode information
about likely ﬁght outcomes, particularly in multi-party
conﬂicts, and are examples of what we have called slow
variables[6].Slowvariables,whethersocialorbiological,
arise from mechanisms that naturally integrate over fast,
microscopicdynamics.Proteins,forexample,havealong
half-life relative to RNA transcripts, and can be thought
ofasthesummedoutputoftranslation.Cellshavealong
half-life relative to proteins, and are a function of the
summedoutputofarraysofspatiallystructuredproteins.
Social power scores in our primate study group have a
long half-life compared with individual interactions.
Power, proteins and cells—as different as they are—all
represent some average measure of the noisier activity
of their constituents. As summary statistics for lower
level dynamics, these variables can serve as reliable
reference states that, when perceivable by system com-
ponents, can be used by components to make
strategical decisions and tune their behaviour.
(a) Cognitive and computational issues
A critical point I have tried to emphasize throughout the
case study is that only when detectable by the system or its
components can slow variables reduce environmental
uncertainty, and, by increasing predictability, promote
accelerated rates of microscopic adaptation [6]. Identify-
ing reliable, predictive coarse-grained statistics is a non-
trivial problem in most living systems for both observers
and the system itself. The system or its components
might not have the necessary search or computational
capacity.Inthecaseofpower,ifindividualsdonotinteract
frequently enough to build up a history of ﬁghts, large
asymmetries might not get established or be perceived,
and the social contract might not arise as a solution
to conﬂict.
Additionally,theconceptofstatisticalsufﬁciency[36]
tells us that a sizable dataset is required tovalidate that a
posited slow variable is actually a good predictor of the
future state of the system. These data are almost never
available to observers and are almost certainly not avail-
abletocomponentsofthesystem.Hence,ifwearetoﬁnd
natural coarse-grainings [37,38] of system dynamics, we
must work towards formal descriptions that reﬂect
both mathematical rigour and biological parsimony.
Formalismsdescribinghowfunctionallyusefulaggregate
properties are encoded in interaction network data
ideallywillbecognitivelygrounded,insofarastheform-
alisms will take into account factors such as the largest
rate of change decreasing
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Figure 2. Schematicillustratingthedynamicsandproliferation
oftemporalscalesunderlyingtheconsolidationofpowerstruc-
tureandtheemergenceofanewconﬂictmanagementfunction
through the build-up and ampliﬁcation of asymmetries result-
ing from competitive interactions among individuals. The
dashed arrows represent feedback from consolidating higher
levels of organization to lower levels. Solid lines indicate a
feed-forward process whereby summary statistics or coarse-
grainedvariablesgetconsolidatedassmallﬂuctuationsincom-
petitive ability at the individual level are ampliﬁed through
memory, generating long-lived asymmetries in competitive
ability, or as individuals come to learn underlying differences
in competitive ability. As a consequence of integrating over
abundant microscopic processes, these consolidating sum-
mary statistics, which we call slow variables, provide better
predictors of the local future conﬁguration of a system than
the states of the ﬂuctuating microscopic components. See §3
for further details.
Mechanistic origins of social structure J. C. Flack 1807
Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2012)dataset that can be recorded and processed by any
component ofthe system givenits cognitive capacity[6].
(b) Social niche construction as collective
slow-variable construction
Socialnicheconstructionhasbeendeﬁnedastheprocess
wherebyindividualsinsocialgroups,byedge-buildingin
their social networks, collectively co-construct aggregate
level social properties with functional implications for
individuals (deﬁned in supplement to Flack et al.[ 17]).
Such properties can include the degree of assortativity
or clustering characterizing the social networks. These
properties have functional implications for individuals
if—forexample—they constrain strategy choiceby limit-
ing who interacts with whom, or if they inﬂuence the
consequences of strategy choice by affecting how
knowledge, emotion, or behaviour ﬂows over networks.
In our macaque study group, power is a collectively
constructed social variable with causal implications for
the constructors. It has implications for interaction fre-
quency and conﬂict management, which in turn have
been shown to affect how individuals construct edges
in their afﬁliation networks. As I have discussed, these
networks provide access to critical social resources,
such as alliance and coalition partners, and individuals
with information about ecological resources such as
the location of food and sleeping sites. In addition,
data from baboons suggest that the quality of the
social networks constructed by mothers can impact off-
spring survival [39]. This means that in addition to the
direct effects on the constructor, social niche construc-
tion can also affect the constructor’s offspring.
Thedominantemphasisinthenicheconstructionlit-
erature has been on the ﬁtness consequences of niche
construction for the constructor and its offspring [15]
with little attention to the feed-forward construction
dynamic. However, the data I have reviewed in this
paper indicate that the mapping between constructor
behaviour and the constructed variables can be non-
trivial and can play a substantial role in determining
the character and strength of the feedback effects. This
implies that we will be in a better position to study
the evolution of the social niche construction once we
take seriously the mapping from individual behaviour
to social structure, and can describe algorithmically
how aggregate social properties are produced.
(c) The mechanistic causes of new levels
of organization
Anunansweredquestioninevolutionarytheoryiswhylife
organizes itself hierarchically [40–44]. From cells, to
organisms, to societies, evolution generates structures
nested in space and time. My collaborators and I have
proposed that the construction of slow variables—
whether subordination contracts, ocean reefs, proteins
or cells—reduces environmental uncertainty and rep-
resents the ﬁrst step in the evolution of a multi-scale
system [6]. The underlying idea is that multiple time-
scales can solve the dual problem of informational
noise and informational lock-in. As an interaction
history accumulates at the lower level, competitive
dynamics amplify asymmetries among components
and slowly changing, coarse-grained representations of
these dynamics become more predictive of the future
state of the system than the interactions themselves.
A new level of organization arises as components
begin using these slowly changing coarse-grained stat-
istics to make strategical decisions. The concordant
increase in predictability resulting from reliance on
thecoarse-grainedrepresentationscanpromoteacceler-
ated rates of microscopic adaptation in two ways: by
allowing components to ﬁne-tune their behaviour, and
by freeing components to search at low cost (because
the alternatives are selectively neutral) a larger space
of strategies for extracting resources. The in-ﬂux
events, on the other hand, allow the system and its
components to closely track environmental changes,
allowing adaptation and preventing lock-in.
Under this view, integrated, coordinated aggregates
are a solution to uncertainty. If correct, this perspec-
tive would suggest that emergence of new levels of
biological and social organization, and perhaps the
major transitions [42], cannot be accounted for with-
out explicit consideration of developmental dynamics
underlying multi-scale systems.
6. METHODS
(a) Study system
Macaque societies are characterized by social learning
at the individual level, social structures that arise from
nonlinear processes and feedback to inﬂuence indivi-
dual behaviour, frequent non-kin interactions and
multiplayer conﬂict interactions, the cost and beneﬁts
of which can be quantiﬁed at the individual level
[17,24,25,31,32,45–47] .T h e s ep r o p e r t i e sm a k et h e
macaque genus and its representative species excellent
choices fordrawing inferences about critical processesin
social evolution as well as for developing new modelling
approaches that are intended to apply more broadly.
The dataset, collected by J.C. Flack, is from a large,
captive, breeding group of pigtailed macaques that
was housed at the Yerkes National Primate Research
Center in Lawrenceville, Georgia. The study group
had a demographic structure approximating wild popu-
lations.Subadultmaleswereregularlyremovedtomimic
emigration occurring in wild populations. The group
contained 84 individuals, including four adult males,
25 adult females and 19 subadults (totalling 48 socially
mature individuals used in the analyses). All individuals,
except eight (four males and four females), were either
natal to the group or had been in the group since for-
mation. The group was housed in an indoor–outdoor
facility, the outdoorcompoundofwhich was12565 ft.
Pigtailed macaques are indigenous to Southeast
Asia and live in multi-male, multi-female societies
characterized by female matrilines and male group
transfer upon the onset of puberty [48]. Pigtailed
macaques breed all year. Females develop swellings
when in oestrus.
(b) Data collection protocol
During observations, all individuals were conﬁned to
the outdoor portion of the compound and were visible
to the observer. The 156 h of observations occurred
for up to 8 h daily between 1100 and 2000 h over a
20 week period from June until October 1998 and
were evenly distributed over the day. Provisioning
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vations. The data were collected over a 4 month
period during which the group was stable (deﬁned as
no reversals in status-signalling interactions resulting
in a change to an individual’s power score).
Conﬂict and power (subordination signal) data were
collected using an all-occurrence sampling procedure
in which the compound was repeatedly scanned from
left to right for onset of conﬂict or the occurrence
of silent-BT displays (used to measure power, see
§6c). The entire conﬂict event was then followed,
including start time, end time and the identity of indi-
viduals involved as aggressors, recipients or interveners
(see §6c for operational deﬁnitions). Although con-
ﬂicts in this study group can involve many
individuals, participation is typically serial, making it
possible to follow the sequence of interactions. A
nearly complete time series of conﬂict events is avail-
able for each observation period.
(c) Operational deﬁnitions
Conﬂict/ﬁght: includes any interaction in which one
individual threatens or aggresses a second individual.
A conﬂict was considered terminated if no aggression
or withdrawal responses (ﬂeeing, crouching, scream-
ing, running away and submission signals) occurred
for 2 min from the last such event. A conﬂict can
involve multiple pairs if pairwise conﬂicts result in
aggressive interventions by third parties or redirec-
tions by at least one conﬂict participant. In addition
to aggressors, a conﬂict can include individuals who
show no aggression (e.g. recipients or third-parties
who either only approach the conﬂict or show afﬁl-
iative/submissive behaviour upon approaching, see
[32]). Because conﬂicts involve multiple players, two
or more individuals can participate in the same conﬂict
but not interact directly.
Agonistic dyad: includes interaction between pairs
within a conﬂict. At least one individual in the pair
must direct aggression towards the other. Individual
i is said to be the winner if its opponent, individual
j exhibits withdrawal-related behaviour (crouching,
shrinking, backing away, screaming, running away and
emitting a submission signal) in response to the behav-
iour of i and this withdrawal-related behaviour is not
superseded by aggressive behaviour towards i at any
point during the conﬂict. Individual i is said to be the
loser if it is the one to show withdrawal-related behav-
iour. The interaction is said to result in a draw if both
i and j direct aggression towards each other and this
aggression is not superseded by withdrawal-related be-
haviour, or if one individual directs aggression towards
the other and the other shows no response.
Subordination signal: the subordination signal in
the pigtailed macaque communication repertoire is
the peacefully emitted variant of the silent-BT display.
BT displays are marked by a retraction of the lips and
mouth corners such that the teeth are partially bared.
In pigtailed macaques, the SBToccurs in two contexts:
peaceful and agonistic SBT, see Flack & de Waal [32].
Signals in both contexts are highly unidirectional. The
agonistic SBTencodes submission. The peaceful vari-
ant signals agreement to primitive social contract in
which the signaller has the subordinate role [32].
Power: the degree of consensus among group mem-
bers that an individual can successfully use force in
social contexts. For details on the algorithms used to
compute power, see [21,22]. This is a simpliﬁcation of
an information theoretic formalism based on the Shan-
nonentropywedevelopedinFlack&Krakauer[21].We
use it here because it gives a good approximation of the
power distribution and is a calculation that is easy to
compute when analysing models [23].
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ENDNOTES
1The quantitative literature on urban scaling covers another set of
issues and type of data critical to understanding social system devel-
opmental dynamics. Space constraints prohibit coverage here, but
see Bettencourt et al. [20].
2Note that although the signal exchange is pairwise, alliances (which
add structure) and coalitions (which add stochasticity) can affect
the outcomes of ﬁghts. Hence hidden in the pairwise exchange is
polyadic information.
3Inotethatinanimalbehaviourthestandardapproachtoorderingindi-
viduals based on dominance-related behaviour is to construct a
dominance hierarchy. There are many well-known algorithms for gen-
erating dominance hierarchies. Manyof these algorithms order pairs of
individuals sothat theorder minimizesthe numberofintransitivities in
a matrix containing information about dominance interactions (e.g.
wins,subordinationsignals).Theresultingrankorderisstrictlytheout-
comeofpairwiseassessments,ratherthentheoutcomeofawholegroup
or population-level assessment, and hence does not necessarily order
individuals according to how much consensus there is that they can
useforcesuccessfully.Evenifsuchapproachescouldbesaidtomeasure
consensus, their output is (typically) an ordinal, not scalar, rank order.
This means their utility is limited for studying how variance in the dis-
tribution ofpower inﬂuences interactioncost,conﬂict management, or
other social properties that are expected to vary as a function of
momentsofthedistributionofpower.Inote,however,thatinsocialsys-
temswithanormaldistributionofﬁghtingabilitiesandperfectlearning,
there should be no intransitivities in dominance relationships and the
distributionofpowershouldbestbedescribedbyauniformdistribution
that can be effectively captured by an ordinal rank order.
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